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Abstract. In the sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, we find 
one of Hegel’s famous puns, which utilizes homophonic affinities and differences 
between the verb beiherspielen and the noun Beispiel. I argue that the effect of this 
pun is that the word Beispiel acquires, beyond its usual meaning of ‘example’ or 
‘instance’, the meaning of a play of something inessential, a play in passing. After 
reviewing all available translations into English, I suggest that, in order to preserve 
this wordplay, one can translate Beispiel as ‘by-play’. Furthermore, I analyse other 
occurrences of the word beiherspielen in the Phenomenology and elsewhere in 
Hegel’s texts. Next, I focus on the crucial importance of this pun for Derrida’s 
interpretation and critique of Hegel’s dialectic. Only for a certain loose translation of 
beiherspielen does Derrida’s reasoning appear plausible. I conclude with a 
discussion of the ideal of terminological uniformity in translating Hegel’s texts. In 
preserving the wordplay by translating Beispiel as ‘by-play’, one is forced to sacrifice 
the uniformity of translation. 
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The classical definition of a pun is «to treat homonyms as 
synonyms»1. Hegel is well known for his creative use of language, 
especially for his puns or wordplays2. These puns make substantial 
use of the intricacies of the German language. They serve not only 
to poetically enliven an otherwise ponderous text, but also as 
rhetorical devices, usually expressing a philosophical point. 
Obviously, such linguistic and philosophical factors may pose 
 
* Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic 
 
1 W. Redfern, Puns, London, Blackwell, 1984, p. 17. 
2 On his university webpage, Marshall Brown provides a useful list of these puns 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology: http://faculty.washington.edu/mbrown/hegel.puns.pdf 
(accessed 29 Sep. 2019). 
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challenges for translators. In this article, I want to closely look at 
one of these puns, which utilizes homophonic affinities and 
differences between the verb beiherspielen and the noun Beispiel3. We 
find this pun in the sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, but there are echoes elsewhere in the Phenomenology and in the 
Lectures on Aesthetics. My aim here is twofold. Firstly, I will present, 
compare and evaluate available English translations of the passages 
in question. Secondly, I will discuss the philosophical relevance of 
this pun for our understanding of the sense-certainty chapter and 
other passages in Hegel’s work. Moreover, I will consider modern 
deconstructive interpretations of Hegel’s system which draw on 
this specific pun. 
 
 
1. Beiherspielen and Beispiel in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
Let me begin with the original passage from the Phenomenology4: 
 
¶92 An dem reinen Sein aber, welches das Wesen dieser Ge-
wißheit ausmacht, und welches sie als ihre Wahrheit 
aussagt, spielt, wenn wir zusehen, noch vieles andere bei-
her. Eine wirkliche sinnliche Gewißheit ist nicht nur diese 
reine Unmittelbarkeit, sondern ein Beispiel derselben5. 
 
3 One may wonder whether there is any etymological connection between these 
terms. It must be stressed that any suggested etymological link is highly tenuous. 
The German word Beispiel does not derive from Spiel, but rather from the old 
German root *spel which means ‘narrative’, ‘saying’ or ‘tale’. We can recognize 
the same root in the English words ‘spell’, ‘spelling’ or even ‘gospel’ 
(God’s/good story). The connection between Spiel and Beispiel comes only from 
Middle High German. An etymologically proper translation of Beispiel would be 
‘by-spell’. Cf. Beispiel, in W. Pfeifer et al., Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen, 
1993, https://www.dwds.de/wb/Beispiel (accessed 2 Oct. 2019). 
4 Italics are always original; I have highlighted in bold the expressions that make 
up the relevant pun, and I shall follow this convention throughout this article. I 
refer to the Phenomenology by paragraph (¶) number and insert such numbers even 
in editions where they originally do not appear. 
5 G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 9, ed. by W. 
Bonsiepen and R. Heede, Hamburg, Meiner, 1980, p. 64. 
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The core of the first sentence is: «An dem reinen Sein […] 
spielt […] noch vieles andere beiher». The verb beiherspielen is a 
compound of the preposition beiher and the main verb spielen. In 
most contexts, spielen can be unproblematically rendered as ‘to 
play’. The preposition beiher is, however, rather peculiar and un-
common, and was in Hegel’s time too6. There are a few 
occurrences in Lessing7 in the sense of ‘something inessential in 
addition to’. There is also the compound beihersagen, which means 
‘to say something in passing’. The usual translation of Beispiel is 
‘example’. However, given this specific context, the word Beispiel 
acquires, beyond its usual meaning, the meaning of the substantiv-
ized form of beiherspielen, that is, as we will see later, das 
Beiherspielende: a play of something inessential, a play in passing, a 
by-play. This is confirmed in the next paragraph, where Hegel 
makes a distinction between Wesen and Beispiel: 
 
¶93 Diesen Unterschied des Wesens und des Beispiels, der 
Unmittelbarkeit und der Vermittlung, machen nicht nur 
wir, sondern wir finden ihn an der sinnlichen Gewißheit 
selbst […]8. 
 
The distinction between Wesen/essence and Beispiel makes 
sense only if Beispiel expresses something inessential, possibly in 
addition to its usual meaning of instance9. The word Beispiel ac-
quires in itself a certain dialectical opposition between an instance 
 
6 More common German prepositions with similar meanings are nebenbei and 
nebenher. The latter is closer to beiher, whereas nebenbei has devaluating connota-
tions which beiher does not. 
7 In Nathan der Weise, 2.2 and Emilia Galotti, 4.7. 
8 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 64. 
9 Warminski thinks that, on later occasions, Hegel uses Beispiel as ‘instance’, i.e. 
in its normal usage: «That ‘an actual sense-certainty is not only this pure imme-
diacy, but an example (Beispiel) of it’ means both ‘by-play’ – particular, inessential 
and so on – and ‘example’ as it later appears in the text (and as in its ‘normal’ 
usage)» (A. Warminski, Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger, Minne-
apolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 177). I think, in contrast, that 
Beispiel appears in both meanings in ¶93. 
           Jakub Mácha                                  Effects of Translation 
 
230
of essence and a play of something inessential. The challenge for a 
translator is to preserve this dialectical tension. 
 
1.1. Translations into English 
 
There are two older translations of the Phenomenology: James 
Baillie’s from 1910 and Arnold Miller’s from 1970. Moreover, there 
are three recent translations: Terry Pinkard’s from 2018 (drafts of 
this translation have been available online since 2008), Michael In-
wood’s from 2018 and Peter Fuss and John Dobbins’s from 2019. 
Beside these, there is a translation of the section on consciousness 
by Kenneth Westphal from 2016 and a translation of the sense-
certainty chapter by Kenley Dove from 200110. Here are the trans-




¶92 But, when we look closely, there is a good deal more 
implied in that bare pure being, which constitutes the kernel 
of this form of certainty, and is given out by it as its truth. A 
concrete actual certainty of sense is not merely this pure im-
mediacy, but an example, an instance, of that immediacy. 
[…] 
¶93 It is not only we who make this distinction of essential 
truth and particular example, of essence and instance, im-





¶92 But when we look carefully at this pure being which con-
stitutes the essence of this certainty, and which this 
 
10 I have tried as far as possible to list and consider all translations of the Phenome-
nology or at least of the sense-certainty chapter. There are many more translations 
of these paragraphs spread throughout Hegel scholarship. Cf., for example, H.S. 
Harris’s translation and commentary in Hegel’s Ladder (I: The Pilgrimage of Reason, 
Indianapolis, Hackett, 1997, p. 213) where the pun is preserved, or Derrida’s trans-
lation, discussed below. I cannot consider all such translations here. 
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certainty pronounces to be its truth, we see that much more 
is involved. An actual sense-certainty is not merely this 
pure immediacy, but an instance of it. 
[…] 
¶93 It is not just we who make this distinction between es-
sence and instance, between immediacy and mediation; on 




¶92 In pure being, however, which constitutes the essence of 
this certainty and which this mode of knowing claims as its 
truth, there is a good deal more at play when we look on. 
An actual case of sense-certainty not only is this pure imme-
diacy, but also plays the role of being an example of it. 
[…] 
¶93 This distinction of essence and example, of immediacy 
and mediation, is not merely one that we make; we find it 




¶92 If we look closely, however, much more is involved in 
this pure being which constitutes the essence of this certainty, 
and which it pronounces as its truth. An actual sense cer-
tainty is not only this pure immediacy, but an example of it. 
[…] 
¶93 This difference between essence and example, be-
tween immediacy and mediation, isn’t made just by us, 




¶92 But in this pure Being, which constitutes the essence of 
this certainty, and which this certainty claims to be its truth, 
much more comes into play, if we look. An actual sensory 
certainty is not just this pure immediacy, but an 
exemplifying by-play of it. 




¶93 It is not just we who draw this distinction between the 
essence and the byplay, between immediacy and media-




¶92 However, if we take a look at it there is a good deal 
more in play in this pure being which constitutes the essence 
of this certainty and which declares it to be its truth. An 
actual sensuous-certainty is not only this pure immediacy 
but also an example of it. 
[…] 
¶93 It is not only we who make this difference of essence 
and example, of immediacy and mediation. Rather, it is 
that we find this difference in sensuous-certainty itself […]. 
 
Fuss and Dobbins (2019): 
 
¶92 Yet as we watch, we see that a lot more is in play in 
the ‘sheer being’ that constitutes this certainty’s essence and 
that it asserts as its truth. In actual occurrence sense-cer-
tainty isn’t just ‘pure immediacy,’ but rather an instance of 
such. 
[…] 
¶93 It is not just we who make this distinction between es-
sence and instance, between immediacy and mediation; on 
the contrary, we find it within sense-certainty itself […]11. 
 
11 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J.B. Baillie, Mineola, New York, 
Dover Publications, 2003, p. 55. 
Id., Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, 
p. 59. 
Id., ‘Sense-Certainty’, from the Phenomenology of Spirit, Chapter 1, trans. by K.R. 
Dove, «The Philosophical Forum», XXXII (4), 2001, p. 400. 
K. Westphal, The Beginning of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: Introduction 
(Einleitung) and Consciousness: Sense Certainty, Perception, Force & Understanding, 
«The Owl of Minerva», XLVII (1-2), 2015-2016, p. 16. 
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We can see that Pinkard’s, Inwood’s, Fuss and Dobbins’s and 
Dove’s translations render beiherspielen as ‘being in play’ or ‘coming 
into play’. They preserve the term Spiel (‘play’) from the original 
beiherspielen. The other translations use other verbs (‘implied’, ‘in-
volved’) which are not etymologically related to play. The pun is 
lost here. If Beispiel is translated as ‘instance’ or ‘example’, there is 
no homophonic relation to ‘play’ from the previous sentence. Here 
too the pun is not preserved12. The only translation that preserves 
‘play’ in both cases is Inwood’s, which renders Beispiel as «exempli-
fying by-play», and as ‘by-play’ in the second paragraph. Inwood’s 
translation sustains the dual meaning of Beispiel: ‘example’ and ‘by-
play’. In ¶93, Beispiel means both example in our normal usage (ex-
emplifying ‘this pure immediacy’ of essence) and ‘by-play’ (of 
accidental moments). Inwood’s translation as «exemplifying by-
play» is an attempt to preserve both meanings. 
 
1.2. Beiherspielen elsewhere in Hegel’s texts 
 
Later in the Phenomenology, Hegel uses the verb beiherspielen or 
its substantivized forms das Beiherspielende and ein Beiherspielen in a 
privative manner and in contrast to essence or substance. In sense-
certainty, the wealth of sensory knowledge is only in play beside it 
(‘nur das Beiherspielende’) (¶112). The translations are: ‘merely 
 
G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit: Translated with introduction and commentary, 
trans. by M. Inwood, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 43-44. 
Id., The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by T. Pinkard, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2018, p. 61. 
Id., The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by P. Fuss and J. Dobbins, Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2019, p. 49. 
12 Similarly to Pinkard, the following French translations – by Jean Hyppolite 
(1941), Bernard Bourgeois (2006), Jean-Pierre Lefebvre (2012) – preserve, in 
various ways, ‘play’/‘jeu’ in beiherspielen, but convey Beispiel as ‘un exemple’. 
G.W.F. Hegel, La Phénoménologie de l’esprit, trans. by J. Hyppolite, Paris, Aubier, 
1941, pp. 82-83. 
Id., Phénoménologie de l’esprit, trans. by B. Bourgeois, Paris, Vrin, 2006, pp. 132-133. 
Id., Phénoménologie de l’esprit, trans. by J.-P. Lefebvre, Paris, Flammarion, 2012. 
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alongside’ (Baillie), ‘source of instances’ (Miller), ‘merely incidental’ 
(Westphal), ‘only ancillary’ (Pinkard), ‘only in play beside’ (In-
wood), ‘merely an abundance of instances’ (Fuss and Dobbins). 
Miller and Fuss and Dobbins, in my view mistakenly, translate das 
Beiherspielende as ‘instance’, which does not capture Beiherspielen at 
all. All other translations render the accidental moment. On top of 
that, Inwood also preserves the moment of play. 
Later, in the section on religion, Hegel alludes to the sense-
certainty chapter when he writes: 
 
¶687 Der Inhalt, den dies reine Sein entwickelt, oder sein 
Wahrnehmen ist daher ein wesenloses Beiherspielen an 
dieser Substanz, die nur aufgeht, ohne in sich niederzugehen, 
Subjekt zu werden und durch das Selbst ihre Unterschiede 
zu befestigen13. 
 
Baillie translates «ein wesenloses Beiherspielen» with the verb 
‘play’, Miller renders it as «an essenceless by-play», Pinkard similarly 
as «an essenceless byplay», Inwood surprisingly less aptly as «an 
essenceless sideshow» and Fuss and Dobbins, quite oddly, as «a 
manner of instantiation that has no essence». 
Similar wordings can be found in Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, 
translated by Thomas Knox. Art can have various external pur-
poses and then be «a mere passing amusement»14 («ein bloßes 
Beiherspielen»). In conscious symbolism, the meaning is primary, 
and its concrete visualization (Verbildlichung) «is only something ac-
cessory and an accompaniment to it»15 («nur das Danebenstehende 
und Beiherspielende»). Forms should only appear in genuine works 
of art «as mere accessories»16 («als ein bloßes Beiwesen bei-
herspielen»). In the classical mode of representation, «here and 
 
13 Id., Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 371. 
14 Id., Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. by T.M. Knox, 2 vols., Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 7. 
15 Ivi, p. 381. 
16 Ivi, p. 396. 
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there some symbolic ingredients have their part to play too»17 
(«symbolische Ingredienzen beiherspielen»). When Hegel speaks 
of rhyme in poetry, he says that the artistic imagination, by focus-
ing on the spiritual meaning, strips away the corporeal side of 
language and leaves it as «insignificant by-play»18 («unbedeutend 
beiherspielen»). Although such sensuous forms have «only a sub-
ordinate part to play»19 in communication («die sinnliche Seite der 
Mitteilung das nur Beiherspielende bleibt»), they provide material 
for artistic treatment by the poet. As we see, Knox translates bei-
herspielen as something accidental (passing, accessory, 
accompaniment, insignificant, subordinate), but occasionally pre-
serves the moment of play (part to play, by-play). Each occurrence 
of beiherspielen is translated differently. In the Lectures on Aesthetics, 
however, Hegel seems neither to be using this expression in any 
technical sense nor alluding to his usage in the Phenomenology. 
It has often been observed that the meanings of some of He-
gel’s key terms are close to those of their etymological German, 
Latin or Greek equivalents. Before moving on to a discussion of 
the philosophical relevance of the wordplay in question, I would 
like to note the etymological affinity between Hegel’s usage of 
Beispiel and beiherspielen and the (old) Greek term para-deigma. The 
prefix beiher has a meaning close to the Greek prefix para, whose 
meaning revolves around ‘from the side of’, ‘from beside’ and 
‘alongside’20. It might be that Hegel, in coining this prefix, aimed 
to approximate the Greek para. In that case, however, there is a 
way of understanding the by-play as a mediation between a singular 
example and a universal paradigm/model. That is what I shall ar-





17 Ivi, p. 432. 
18 Ivi, p. 1023. 
19 Ivi, p. 964. 
20 Cf. the entry on ‘παρά’ in H. Liddell and R. Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English 
Lexicon, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1889, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hop-
per/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0058:entry=para/ (accessed 24 Oct. 2019). 




2. By-play as a mediation between singular and universal 
 
In ¶92, Hegel states that the essence of a sense-certainty is 
pure being, a pure this, a pure singular. But there is something 
more in play: a host of distinct qualities («Menge unterschiedlicher 
Beschaffenheiten») of the I and the object. The pure certainty is 
thus mediated by the I and the object with all their accidental prop-
erties. But what does the by-play mediate? I argue elsewhere21 in 
detail that essenceless by-play is the mediation between the singular 
this and the universal moment of the concept. By-play is, thus, the 
particular which mediates between the singular and the universal. 
In today’s usage, an example exemplifies the essential proper-
ties of what it is an example of. The table I am now sitting at 
exemplifies the essence of the universal concept of a table (having 
some legs, a tabletop, etc.). This table also has accidental properties 
that do not belong to the essence of the concept of a table (having 
exactly four legs, being made of wood, etc.). Another example of a 
table must exemplify the same essence but can have different acci-
dental properties (having one leg, being made of metal, etc.). To 
make an example of a table, one can take any table, whatever table. 
Its accidental properties do not matter; what matters are the essen-
tial properties. Being an example also suggests that there is 
something more, that there are other examples that have different 
accidental properties. An example, even in its usual usage, is never 
a pure singularity. That is, incidentally, the reason why the transla-
tion of Beispiel as ‘example’ or ‘instance’ is not quite wrong and 
does not render the passage as a whole incomprehensible.22 Only 
the accidental or inessential moment of the by-play gets lost.  
In one sense, an essenceless by-play is the negation of the essence. 
However, in this essenceless by-play, accidental properties do mat-
ter. They, in some sense, become essential. More generally, in the 
 
21 J. Mácha, Reverberating the glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in 
Hegel’s Logic of the Concept, «Hegel Bulletin» (forthcoming). 
22 Cf. Robert Brandom’s discussion of ¶92 – quoted in Miller’s translation – in 
his A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Cambridge, MA, Har-
vard University Press, 2019, p. 116. 
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dialectical process, the accident becomes the essence and, con-
versely, the essence becomes the accident. This twofold becoming 
is what Catherine Malabou calls plasticity23. 
 
2.1. Deconstructive perspective 
 
Let us move now to Derrida’s deconstructive interpretation 
of Hegel. This final section is a kind of case study illustrating the 
importance of translation decisions. Hegel’s redefinition of Beispiel 
as both example and by-play is a crucial part of Derrida’s argument 
in Glas, his book-length interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. 
Moreover, the dialectical or speculative nature of examples is one 
of the key insights driving Derrida’s deconstructive project. Der-
rida repeatedly notes that an example points at something beyond 
its singularity. An example is never singular. Here is an illustrative 
passage: 
 
What example? This one. And certainly, when I say this 
very example, I already say something more and something 
else; I say something which goes beyond the tode ti, the this 
of the example. The example itself, as such, overflows its 
singularity as much as its identity24. 
 
Similar formulations can be found throughout Derrida’s writ-
ings. The singularity of an example is its essence. In overflowing 
this singularity, it, thus, overflows its essence: that is, a play of ac-
cidental moments, an essenceless by-play. Derrida then focuses on 
the logic of this by-play, that is, on how it is supposed to reach the 
general law which is the universal moment of the concept. The by-
play can be conceived as a series of examples that issue in an ex-
emplary example or ‘the exemplarity of the example’, i.e. a 
universal paradigm/model. This is, in a nutshell, how the initially 
singular example becomes the universal concept. 
 
23 C. Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans. by L. 
During, London, Routledge, 2005. 
24 J. Derrida, Passions: ‘An Oblique Offering’, in Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. by D. 
Wood, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 5-35, p. 15. 
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This straightforward passage is complicated by the fact that 
the distinction between the essence and the by-play/Beispiel (as-
serted at the beginning of ¶93 above) is not clear. It is, rather, 
obscure and fluctuating (or ‘plastic’) in the by-play. Some essential 
properties may become accidental; they may, so to speak, be drawn 
into the by-play. If so, it is conceivable that the whole essence 
could turn into an accident. The by-play would absorb the essence. 
What would be left is a pure accident that never achieves the status 
of universal concept. The by-play would negate the dialectic. Der-
rida, in fact, considers this negation when he says that the logic of 
exemplarity can lead to an ‘abyss’25. 
What is important for present purposes is that Derrida finds 
support for his argument in Hegel’s discussion of the luminous 
essence in the Phenomenology. Derrida argues that the luminous es-
sence is, in fact, a pure being without essence. His main reference 
is ¶687, quoted above: 
 
[The all-burning is] an essenceless by-play, pure accessory 
of the substance that rises without ever setting (ein wesenloses 
Beiherspielen an dieser Substanz, die nur aufgeht, ohne in sich nie-
derzugehen), without becoming a subject, and without 
consolidating through the self (Selbst) its differences. 
 
(The German wording in the round brackets is provided by Der-
rida himself). He goes on: 
 
A pure essenceless by-play, a play that plays limitlessly, even 
though it is already destined to work in the service of essence 
and sense. But as such, supposing that ‘as such’ can be said 
of something that is not some thing, this play does not yet 
work, does not yet have any onto-theo-teleological horizon: 
fire artist without being. The word itself (Beiherspielen) plays 
 
25 J. Derrida and E. Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow … (A Dialogue), trans. by J. 
Fort, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 120. Elsewhere, Derrida uses 
expressions such as ‘explosion’, ‘explosive surprise’, ‘gelignite dynamite’, ‘abso-
lute interruption’, ‘the Absolute Other’, ‘the uncontrollable as such’, ‘the 
unsteadiness’. 
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the example (Beispiel) beside the essence. Here the pure ex-
ample plays beside the essence so much, holds itself so 
diverted from [à ľécart de] the essence, that it has no essence: 
pure example, without essence, without law. Therefore with-
out example, like God about which Hegel says that an 
example cannot be made, but because he, God, merges with 
the pure essence, pure essence is also without example26. 
 
What is of interest for present purposes is not the plausibility 
of Derrida’s reasoning, but translational issues pertaining to these 
passages. Both texts, the quotation from the Phenomenology and Der-
rida’s comment, were translated into English by John Leavey and 
Richard Rand, and published in 1986. The translators did not make 
use of any existing translation of Hegel, but apparently translated 
into English Derrida’s own translation into French. Derrida trans-
lates wesenloses Beiherspielen as «un jeu sans essence, pur accessoire», 
whereas Jean Hyppolite’s translation, which was available in the 
1970s, renders the passage as «un jeu sans essence, accessoire». 
Leavey and Rand translate wesenloses Beiherspielen as «essenceless by-
play, pure accessory». The addendum ‘pure accessory’, which does 
not occur in Hegel’s text, prioritizes Derrida’s critical interpreta-
tion of Hegel’s dialectic. Why ‘pure accessory’? Hegel’s position is 
clear: he thinks that there is a «pure being» and «essenceless by-
play» in addition or as an accessory to it. To call this accessory pure 
suggests that there might exist only this accessory without any es-
sence, i.e. a pure accident – a rupture in the dialectical process. This 
is what Derrida’s interpretation is getting at. 
Another translational issue related to Derrida’s interpretation 
is this: Derrida connects the dialectics between essence and by-play 
from ¶92 with the essenceless by-play of the luminous essence 
from ¶687. He understands the two occurrences of beiherspielen, in 
¶92 and ¶687, in the same sense. To comprehend Derrida’s inter-
pretation, one has to translate both occurrences uniformly – or at 
least preserve the root word ‘play’. As we see above, only Pinkard’s 
translation fulfils this condition. 
 
26 J. Derrida, Glas, trans. by J. Leavey Jr. and R. Rand, Lincoln, University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986, pp. 238-239. 




3. Concluding remarks 
 
I do not want to suggest that one translation is superior to 
another in all respects. Each of the proposals discussed above has 
some merits and translates this or that passage more aptly than an-
other. The same is true for the older translations by Baillie and 
Miller. It is obvious that each translation depends on the transla-
tor’s grasp of the text and their particular interpretation. Hegel uses 
everyday words (Begriff, aufheben, Geist, Wirklichkeit, etc.), but some-
times gives them a very technical meaning, or rather a plurality of 
meanings. On the one hand, to preserve the everydayness, the 
translator can decide which meaning is the right one in a given 
context. This means, however, that the terminological uniformity 
of the text cannot be preserved (aufheben can be translated, depend-
ing on the context, as ‘cancel’, ‘elevate’, ‘abolish’, ‘supersede’ and 
so forth). This was Baillie’s and Miller’s choice. On the other hand, 
the translator may aim to preserve the uniformity rather than the 
everydayness (translating aufheben uniformly as ‘sublate’). This is, at 
least to a certain extent, what the modern translations strive for27. 
Our wordplay puts this either–or choice between uniformity 
and everydayness into question. Beispiel is a very common German 
word and there is an equally common English counterpart, ‘exam-
ple’. However, in rendering Beispiel consistently as ‘example’, as 
most of the translations do, the crux of the wordplay gets lost. In 
order to preserve the wordplay, Inwood translates Beispiel as «ex-
emplifying by-play» and «byplay» in ¶92 and ¶93 respectively. 
However, Beispiel must be rendered as ‘example’ on many other 
occasions, e.g. in the phrase ‘zum Beispiel’. Inwood thus gives up 
uniformity28. However, ‘by-play’ is not a common word in English, 
 
27 Cf. Pinkard’s critique of the practice of translating Hegel’s key terms non-
uniformly. T. Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 17-19. 
28 David Charlston argues that striving for consistency or uniformity may be an 
expression of translational hexis, i.e. favouring the translator’s own interpreta-
tion. D. Charlston, Translatorial hexis: The politics of Pinkard’s translation of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, «Radical Philosophy», CLXXXVI, 2014, pp. 11-22. Cf. also the 
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but a rather technical term. Inwood thus gives up everydayness 
too. It seems that the price to pay for preserving the wordplay is 
to give up both uniformity and everydayness. 
In contrast, I do not see any reason not to translate beiherspielen 
and its substantivized form uniformly in such a way that the word 
‘play’ is preserved (i.e. as ‘be in play’, ‘be at play’, ‘come into play’). 
However, none of the English translations we have discussed pre-
serves ‘play’ on all three occasions in the Phenomenology, i.e. in ¶92, 
¶112, ¶687. It may be the case that the translators – in contrast to 
Derrida – did not understand beiherspielen as a technical term which 
connects these paragraphs and so should be translated uniformly29. 
 
discussion in N. Walker, Translating Kant and Hegel, in The Routledge Handbook of 
Translation and Philosophy, ed. by J.P. Rawling and P. Wilson, London, Routledge, 
2018, pp. 358-374. 
29 As someone who is a native of neither of the languages discussed in this arti-
cle, I would like to thank Herbert Hrachovec, Ken Westphal, Fritz Kiesow, 
Dinda Gorlee and Terry Pinkard for their comments, especially for sharing their 
linguistic intuitions. This work has been supported by the Czech Science Foun-
dation, project no. GA19-16680S. 
